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CRIMINAL CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENTS: How FAIR ARE THEY?
Samuel A. Perroni* and Mona J. McNutt**
Not only [are] notorious criminals escaping substantial punishment
after long and arduous government efforts to put them behind
bars, but substantial harm [is] being done to the truth-seeking
process, which is supposed to be one of the principal arms of
the criminal justice system. Convicted criminals [are] being used
to breed other criminal convictions, with none of the criminals
receiving substantial punishment as long as they [can] contribute
to enlarging the "body count." (The body count here, of course,
is at least as misleading as that provided by General William
Westmoreland's staff in Vietnam, since the bodies are not really
down and out after conviction. They rise from their ashes as
federal witnesses.)'
It is now commonplace for a prosecutor to coax or arm-twist
an otherwise reluctant witness into testifying for the government
through use of some form of contingency agreement. These agree-
ments are as varied as the factual scenarios in which they are drafted
and often include a combination of inducements designed to en-
courage the witness to testify favorably for the Government. A
prosecutor may promise dismissal of the most serious pending charges,
immunity from prosecution, monetary payment, or the return of
forfeited property. She may offer reduction of an offense to a lesser
included one with a less severe penalty or promise to recommend
probation or a reduced sentence. She might agree to forego pros-
ecuting the witness's family members in exchange for cooperation,
and, most importantly, testimony.
This Article focuses on the constitutionality of contingency fee
agreements in criminal cases in light of the inherent dangers such
agreements pose to the integrity of the judicial system. Do agreements
conditioned upon performance deemed satisfactory by the prosecution
and the sentencing court subject witnesses to such enormous pressures
* Samuel A. Perroni is the Senior Partner, The Perroni Law Firm, P.A., B.S.
1970, J.D. 1974, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, Editor in Chief, Arkansas
Trial Notebook.
** Mona J. McNutt is an Associate, The Perroni Law Firm, B.S.E. 1972, J.D.
1992, University of Arkansas at Little Rock.
1. Yvette A. Beeman, Note, Accomplice Testimony Under Contingent Plea
Agreements, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 800, 824 n.139 (1987) (quoting Silvergate, Brief
Cases, Boston Phoenix, Sept. 3, 1985, at 3).
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to gain their freedom or the promised benefits that perjury is likely
to occur? If so, may the court admit testimony stemming from these
agreements without abrogating its duty to zealously guard a criminal
defendant's absolute right to due process of law? This article explores
relevant case law in an effort to expose the unfairness and unre-
liability of testimony generated by offers of reward, leniency, and
freedom.
I. HISTORY OF CONTINGENT FEE TESTIMONY
Early common law sanctioned a practice, known as "approve-
ment," under which accused felons could be pardoned by testifying
against an accomplice who was then convicted.2 This doctrine was
abandoned in the 1500s as courts began to recognize that the like-
lihood of perjury was enormous when a witness could only escape
execution by providing testimony sufficient to convict an alleged
accomplice.' Later, a similar practice, known as "turning king's
evidence," 4 evolved to encourage reluctant witnesses to testify against
their alleged cohorts. Those who turned king's evidence were eligible
for pardon simply by providing full and truthful testimony, regardless
of whether a conviction resulted. American jurisprudence incorpo-
rated and eventually expanded this English tradition to encompass
the myriad of leniency agreements now used by prosecutors to obtain
beneficial testimony.5
Today, prosecutors are given wide latitude in drawing up and
entering into agreements with cooperating witnesses on the premise
that probative evidence would be otherwise unobtainable.6 Presum-
ably, systemic safeguards like the sworn oath or affirmation, the
solemnity of the legal proceeding, and perjury and contempt statutes
will compel the witness to give complete and truthful answers at
trial. 7 Bargains for immunity or leniency are deemed acceptable as
long as the agreement provides that the witness will testify fully and
fairly.8
2. Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND.
L. REv. 1, 7 (1992).
3. Neil B. Eisenstadt, Note, Let's Make a Deal: A Look At United States v.
Dailey and Prosecutor-Witness Cooperation Agreements, 67 B.U. L. Rv. 749, 761
(1987).
4. Id.; King v. United States, 203 F.2d 525, 526 (8th Cir. 1953) (relating
historical use of "king's evidence" and concluding that the practice was no longer
used).
5. Beeman, supra note 1, at 800.
6. Eisenstadt, supra note 3, at 764.
7. Note, A Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Promises of Favorable Treatment
Made to Witnesses for the Prosecution, 94 HARv. L. Rv., 887, 889 (1981)
[hereinafter Duty to Disclose Promises Made to Witnesses].
8. Cases Noted, Accomplice Testimony Under Conditional Promise of Im-
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Although courts have long recognized that accomplice testimony
is more suspect, and thus of diminished quality, 9 most courts are
unwilling to examine contingency fee agreements closely to determine
the witness's perception of performance required under the contract. 0
Contingency fee agreements are generally unobjectionable if the
witness is led to believe that he is only required to provide full and
fair cooperation and to testify truthfully to the full extent of his
knowledge concerning the specific defendants or particular crimes."
Contingency agreements become constitutionally offensive, however,
when a witness believes he must testify in a particular manner to
reap the benefits offered.' 2 The judiciary is nonetheless reluctant to
find that a witness has been impressed to testify in a particular
fashion in the absence of direct testimony or specific language to
that effect.'
3
One of the earlier cases to consider contingent fee agreements
in a criminal context came out of the Fifth Circuit in 1962. In
Williamson v. United States 4 the court refused to sanction a con-
tingent fee agreement that required the witness to provide evidence
against specific individuals concerning inchoate crimes in exchange
for a stated bounty for each future defendant. 5 The circuit court
munity, 52 CoLUM. L. REv. 138, 139-40 (1952) [hereinafter Conditional Promise
of Immunity].
9. Eisenstadt, supra note 3, at 761.
10. Conditional Promise of Immunity, supra note 8, at 140.
11. Eisenstadt, supra note 3, at 750-51. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts,
618 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1980) (relating that plea agreement would be revoked if
witness testified untruthfully); United States v. Arroyo-Angulo, 580 F.2d 1137 (2d
Cir. 1978) (understanding was that witness would truthfully disclose all information
known regarding criminal matter being pursued), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913 (1978).
12. Beeman, supra note 1, at 802. See, e.g., Franklin v. State, 577 P.2d 860,
862 (Nev. 1978) (holding that where plea bargain tends to lead accomplice to believe
testimony must be of a certain fashion, defendant's due process rights are violated);
People v. Medina, 116 Cal. Rptr. 133, 146 (Cal. 1974) (holding that when prosecution
compelled accomplice to testify in a specific manner defendant was denied a fair
trial); People v. Green, 228 P.2d 867, 871 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951) (holding
that conditional immunity tainted testimony beyond redemption).
13. In United States v. Vida, 370 F.2d 759 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 910 (1967), the court refused to accept the argument that postponing a witness's
sentencing until after he testified at the defendant's trial violated the defendant's
rights of due process and fair treatment. Id. at 767. Instead, citing a string of
cases to support its conclusion that this prosecutorial arrangement was acceptable,
the court stated, "the fact that a witness hopes or expects that he will secure a
mitigation of his own punishment by testifying on behalf of the prosecution does
not disqualify him." Id. at 767-68.
The question then becomes can one testify on behalf of the prosecution in a
criminal case without incriminating the defendant charged therein, and if so, how
could the testimony be considered of benefit to the prosecutor.
14. 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962), overruled by United States v. Cervantes-
Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1987).
15. Id. at 444.
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found this bounty hunter arrangement reprehensible because of the
obvious opportunities for abuse 6 and reversed the conviction. 7
Conversely, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned in
United States v. Librach s that testimony from an accomplice who
was receiving support payments from the Government was properly
admitted. Although the Government witness was given immunity
from prosecution as well,' 9 the court did not consider this combi-
nation of benefits problematic. 0
The 1980s produced a barrage of decisions regarding contingent
fee testimony as prosecutors began utilizing contingency fee agree-
ments more frequently and more innovatively.2' In 1981 the Eighth
Circuit upheld a contingent fee agreement in United States v. Winter
22
in spite of language which would seem to indicate that the court
believed the primary Government witness, Anthony Ciulla, committed
perjury. 23 The court considered Ciulla's testimony "vital to the Gov-
ernment's case . . . "24 but declined to reverse the convictions re-
sulting from his testimony which was given under promise of immunity
from prosecution, leniency of sentencing in state court, relocation
16. Id.
17. Id. at 445.
18. 536 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 939 (1976).
19. Id. at 1230.
20. Id. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the Executive
Branch was vested with sole authority to determine whether to prosecute, and the
decision would not be reviewed in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Id.
Because the support payments were authorized and used for protective custody,
the court saw no basis to infer that the Government had purchased the witness's
testimony. Id. at 1231.
21. See, e.g., United States v. Fallon, 776 F.2d 727 (7th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Kimble, 719 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1983);
1011 (1983); United States v. McGaghren, 666 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1981).
22. 663 F.2d 1120 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983).
23. Id. at 1127. The court observed that "[o]ne of the few subjects on which
the appellants and the Government agree is that the testimony of Anthony Ciulla
was absolutely vital to the case. Testifying under an informal grant of immunity,
Ciulla described in detail a scheme that-not surprisingly-neatly dovetailed with
the indictment." Id.
The court also concluded that:
The Government established by direct examination ... that Ciulla was a
liar, a cheat, and a convicted race-fixer who handed out not only money,
but also cocaine and hashish, as bribes. . . During cross-examination,
Ciulla was forced to admit that his story on direct was filled with a very
large number of minor inaccuracies. Several of the defendants also intro-
duced, or discovered through cross-examination of Ciulla, evidence that
directly contradicted his testimony.
Id. at 1132.
24. Id. at 1127, 1132.
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of him and his family, and federal subsidy payments. 25 Instead, the
Eighth Circuit took refuge in its conclusion that "[d]espite the
apparent holes in his testimony, the jury chose to believe Anthony
Ciulla. This was their prerogative, and the case was properly sub-
mitted to them." '26
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, however, rejected the questionable testimony of an alleged
co-conspirator in United States v. Baresh27 upon concluding that
"the largess of the prosecution's benevolence to Quiroga placed far
more stress upon his veracity (though buttressed by the government's
requirement of truthfulness) than its gossamer frailness could with-
stand." 28 The witness, Quiroga, agreed to provide evidence against
the defendants concerning past acts and anticipated future acts which
would suffice for arrest and indictment. 29 In exchange, he was
promised dismissal of pending charges, immunity, exemption from
fines or forfeitures, reduction of bond, use of his property without
threat of seizure, and release of a prior lien on his property. 0 If,
however, Quiroga testified fully and truthfully but insufficiently for
purposes of indictment, he would receive none of the proffered
benefits.3 The circumstances, coupled with the lack of documentation
to support Quiroga's testimony, convinced the court that admission
of Quiroga's testimony violated due process of law.3 2 The court
25. Id. at 1133.
26. Id. at 1132.
27. 595 F. Supp. 1132 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
28. Id. at 1135.
29. Id. at 1134.
30. Id. There was a taped transcript of a conversation between Quiroga and
the prosecutor in which the prosecutor stated:
[If you are able to provide information and the assistance that results in
the arrest and indictment of Jorge Ubeda and Bill Satterwhite ... then
Mr. Holmes has authorized me to dismiss your case. Like you never got
in any trouble. [sic] ... If your assistance and if the information that
you give these officers results in the arrest and indictment of Jorge Ubeda,
and the seizure of a large shipment of marijuana coming in on a boat,
but you can't do Bill Satterwhite, I don't care how hard you work at it,
and everything, but for one reason or another we cannot arrest or indict
him for anything, then what I have told Ms. Akins and what I'm telling
you is that you are starting at 15 years in the pen (and the things that
you are charged with, if you are found guilty, then the least you can get
is 15 years in the penitentiary, the most you can get is 99 or life).
Id. at 1134 n.2. While the court said that a written agreement also provided for
Quiroga to offer evidence against these individuals as to both past and future
events, the written plea agreement was not set out in the opinion. Id. at 1134.
Undoubtedly, the prosecution was more circumspect in its use of written language
than it was in conversation.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1135-37.
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concluded that the government agents were so obsessed with indicting
specific defendants that they "created a situation which was indeed
an invitation to Quiroga to commit perjury. '33
The Eighth Circuit also found an "invitation to perjury" in
United States v. Waterman34 in 1984, but the opinion was subse-
quently vacated en banc by a six member court that was split evenly
as to the constitutionality of the plea bargain. 35 In Waterman, the
Government agreed to recommend a two-year reduction of the wit-
ness's sentence if his testimony led to further indictments. If there
were no resulting indictments, the Government would not recommend
sentence reduction, but would inform the court of the witness's
cooperation. 36 The Eighth Circuit panel asked whether it is fair
procedure "to reward those who testify for the government contingent
upon the content and results of their testimony, 3 7 and answered
emphatically that it is not.38
One year after Waterman was decided, the Eighth Circuit looked
again at contingent fee agreements in United States v. Bonadonna,39
33. Id. at 1137. After condemning the testimony offered under the agreement,
the court then made a very troubling statement: "Contingent agreements similar
to the one in issue are proper under compelling justifications and circumstances
... which are absent here." Id. These writers cannot conjure up any set of
circumstances that could, in their opinion, justify use of such an agreement.
34. 732 F.2d 1527, 1531 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985).
35. Id. at 1533. Waterman has a remarkable procedural history. The Eighth
Circuit failed to resolve the defendant's contention that the Government entered
into an unconstitutional agreement with the chief witness against him. United States
v. Waterman, 716 F.2d 482 (8th Cir. 1983) (Waterman I). The court denied a
petition for rehearing. Id. The defendant later filed a habeas petition, and the
district court found the plea agreement constitutional. On appeal, on original
consideration the Eighth Circuit reversed. United States v. Waterman, 732 F.2d
1527 (8th Cir. 1984) (Waterman III).
On later consideration by the court en banc, the distriet cniirt'- judgment was
affirmed by an evenly divided six member panel. 732 F.2d at 1533. Chief Judge
Lay was unable to participate in the vote. Id. Interestingly, Judge Lay voted in
the Waterman III panel decision to reverse the defendant's conviction because of
the agreement. Thus, the constitutionality of contingency fee agreements remains
a viable issue in the Eighth Circuit, at least theoretically.
36. Waterman, 732 F.2d at 1530.
37. Id. at 1531.
38. Id. at 1532-33. The Eighth Circuit reasoned:
More fundamentally, however, we see no place in due process law for
positioning the jury to weed out the seeds of untruth planted by the
government. Certainly Gamst might have lied regardless of the contingency
agreement and the jury was generally commissioned to determine the truth
of his testimony; but that is no reason for the government to give him
further incentive to selectively remember past events in a manner favorable
to the indictment or conviction of others.
Id. at 1532.
39. 775 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1985).
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and distinguished the plea agreement under consideration from the
one employed in Waterman.4° The Government agreed to recommend
a sentence of less than five years if its "subjective evaluation ...
of the nature and scope of Mr. Litsky's cooperation" supported
such a recommendation. 4' Judge Harper found it dispositive that
the jury verdict would not influence the Government's recommen-
dation regarding sentencing. 42 In doing so, the court evaded the
defendant's argument that the Government's recommendation would
depend upon Litsky's ability to testify against the defendant in an
incriminating manner.
In United States v. Dailey43 the First Circuit was also unwilling
to view a promise of leniency in sentencing as a contingent reward
for incriminating testimony." The plea agreements in Dailey promised
the witnesses a sentence of not more than twenty years for full
cooperation and a sentence of thirty-five years in the absence of
full cooperation. 45 In addition, there was a third sentencing option-
the Government could recommend a ten year sentence, in its sole
discretion.46 The district court concluded that if full cooperation
merited a twenty year sentence, then something more, such as a
conviction of the defendant, was required to qualify for a ten year
40. Id. at 956.
41. Id.
42. Id. Judge Harper decided that:
A jury's acquittal could not have jeopardized Litsky's reward, while a
guilty verdict did not insure a stronger recommendation from the gov-
ernment. In other words, Litsky had no stake in the outcome of the
litigation. Thus, even if the defendant can find legal support in Waterman,
factually Litsky's plea agreement differs from the one in that case.
Id.
The agreement read as follows:
The United States Government will make known to any sentencing court,
or parole board, the nature and extent of Mr. Litsky's cooperation and
its value to the Government . .. [T]he recommendation of the government
concerning [Litsky's] incarceration at time of sentencing may be less than
five (5) years based upon a subjective evaluation by the Government of
the nature and scope of Mr. Litsky's cooperation.
Id.
The court, making no mention of the fact that the court in Waterman was
equally divided, also relied upon the decision in that earlier case in affirming the
district court decision. Id.
43. 759 F.2d 192 (1st Cir. 1985).
44. Id. at 197. "[N]o promised benefit is made contingent upon a resulting
indictment or conviction." Id.
45. Id. at 194-95.
46. Id. at 194. The agreements provided that this third option depended primarily
upon "the value to the Government of the defendant's cooperation." Id.
1994]
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sentence; therefore, the agreement created "such an inducement to
lie" that the testimony had to be excluded. 47 The First Circuit,
however, refused to attach any significance to the ten year provision
or directly address the issues raised by the district court. Instead,
the court reasoned that traditional safeguards, such as cross-ex-
amination, were sufficient, and the testimony was admissible despite
the agreement. 48 The court considered it significant that while the
agreements provided "some inducement to lie or to embellish the
facts," '49 the inducement did not appear "significantly greater in
degree or more sinister in quality than the inducements created by
agreements that have passed judicial muster in the past." 50
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Fallon,5 employed the
same rationale and ruled that a plea agreement and testimony related
thereto were not violative of due process because of procedural
safeguards, such as jury instructions, disclosure of the agreement at
trial, and cross-examination . 2 The Fallon decision implied that the
Seventh Circuit would be reluctant to exclude testimony under a
plea agreement, regardless of the inducements offered by the Gov-
ernment or their coercive potential.53 Huebner, the Government wit-
ness, entered into a performance agreement with the prosecutor that
indicated the three charges against him would be delayed until after
he had completely cooperated.5 4 If his cooperation materialized as
represented, the Government would recommend that he not be
incarcerated" and would perhaps bring less than three charges.5 6 The
court cited a series of cases upholding plea agreements and chose
to leave the terms of the plea agreements to the discretion of
prosecutors and the procedural safeguards presently in place. 7
47. Id. at 195.
'40. AU."L a, ', 200. I ft I lilt ~IJ.%u-t also, nnou,. d *h cerie otnt'o
these plea agreements" and stated that it shared the "concern and uneasiness" of
the district court, but believed the defendant's rights were adequately protected.
Id. at 196.
49. Id. at 197.
50. Id. at 197-98.
51. 776 F.2d 727 (7th Cir. 1985).
52. Id. at 734.
53. Id. at 733-35. The court stated: "[This informer], perhaps even more than
most informers, may have had motive to lie. But it does not follow that his
tesfimony was untrue, nor does it follow that his testimony was constitutionally
inadmissible." Id. at 734 (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311
(1966)).
54. Fallon, 776 F.2d at 733.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 734-35.
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The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco,58 how-
ever, found a contingent fee agreement unacceptably coercive, and
ruled that the witness's testimony should have been excluded because
it was "inherently untrustworthy." 5 9 The witness testified that he
was paid to infiltrate, gather information, and testify.6 Moreover,
the amount of pay, if any, the witness received for a case was not
determined until he testified at the trial and his performance was
evaluated. 6' The court reasoned that this type of agreement is com-
pletely unacceptable in our judicial system because:
[O]ne of the basics of our jurisprudence is the search for truth,
and by this is meant not the purchased truth, the bartered-for
truth, but the unvarnished truth that comes from the lips of a
man who is known for his integrity. . . The government in its
prosecutorial efforts should be like Caesar's wife, above or beyond
reproach .... It may be that we must live with informers. It
may be that we must live with bargained-for pleas of guilty. But
we do not have to give a receipt stamped "paid in full for your
damaging testimony" or "you will be paid according to how well
you can convince the jury even though it be in the face of lies." 62
In the 1980s, the Eighth Circuit upheld use of testimony under
assorted contingent fee arrangements in a number of decisions. 63 In
United States v. Risken,6 the Eighth Circuit found no due process
58. 800 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1986), reconsidered, United States v. Cervantes-
Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1987).
59. Cervantes-Pacheco, 800 F.2d at 460.
60. Id. at 458. Informant Kelly testified that the amount he received for a job
depended upon "the way they feel I testified or the way they feel about my
infiltrating, gather information, [sic], report that information [sic], and testify [sic]."
Id.
61. Id. at 458, 460-61. The court noted that the precedents were "timid in their
approach to this problem, fearful that somehow the condemnation of contingent
fee arrangements will destroy our criminal justice system." Id. at 461. Judge
Goldberg declared that "[tihe time has come to announce boldly and firmly that
our juridicial search for the truth cannot be reconciled with the virtual purchase
of perjury." Id.
62. Id. at 460-61.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 831 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that
testimony was not inadmissible because of agreement to provide monetary com-
pensation and to waive prosecution), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1073 (1988); United
States v. Spector, 793 F.2d 932 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that testimony was admissible
despite anticipated receipt of $1,000 if testimony led to conviction), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1031 (1987); United States v. Risken, 788 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1986)
(holding that it was not reversible error for Government to have implied agreement
of bonus for witness if defendant convicted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986).
64. 788 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1986).
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violation despite an implied agreement that the Government witness
would receive a bonus if the defendant was convicted.
65
Astonishingly, the Eleventh Circuit recently found no due process
violation when the contingency fee witnesses expected to receive
rewards in the millions of dollars for their testimony and other
assistance. The case, United States v. Wilson,66 involved Government
witnesses who were granted immunity in exchange for testimony and
cooperation. 67 In addition, one witness testified that he understood
that his potential reward for assisting the Government and testifying
could also include a monetary reward of as much as eleven million
dollars. 8 The court decided that this potential reward must be likened
to "other, long-accepted means" used by the Government to obtain
favorable testimony and which were found to comport with due
process. 69 Thus, the court reasoned that the determinative question
was not whether the witness would be inclined to testify as the
Government wished, but whether the jury was prevented from ad-
equately assessing credibility. 70 Judge Rubin stated that the amount
of the potential rewards did not deprive the defendant of his rights
to a fair trial under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.7 1
II. CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENTS CONFLICT WITH BRIBERY
STATUTES
Both federal and state law prohibit bribery and threatening of
witnesses in relation to judicial proceedings.7 2 Presumably, these
65. Id. at 1373. After evaluating his testimony, the Government gave the witness
an additional $5,000 premium. Id.
66. 904 F.2d 656, 660 (11th Cir. 1990).
67. Id. at 657.
V0O. .. a Sl% L 65A5.aA SJA Gov,4iOAOI ULI0 TA C Td n, O4f,,.m. oipte this t eT. M
69. Id. at 660.
70. Id.
71. Id. The court decided that the rewards only went to credibility, not con-
stitutionality. Id.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1988) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever ...
directly or indirectly, gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any
person, for or because of the testimony under oath or affirmation given
or to be given by such person as a witness upon a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding, before any court, any committee of either House or both
Houses of Congress, or any agency, commission, or officer authorized by
the laws of the United States to hear evidence or take testimony, or for
or because of such person's absence therefrom . . . shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.
E.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 5-53-108 (Michie 1993) provides in pertinent part:
(a) A person commits witness bribery if:
(1) He offers, confers, or agrees to confer any benefit upon a witness or
[Vol. 16:211
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statutes were enacted to preserve the integrity of the judicial system
and its truth-seeking process. The ends of justice are best served
when a witness testifies from personal knowledge and perception,
rather than from an incentive to please a party or a party's counsel.
73
Thus, no criminal defense counsel could effectively argue that he
and his client are somehow exempt from the operation of these
statutes.
On the other hand, it has long been accepted in the American
judicial system that prosecutors can offer incentives and rewards to
witnesses for the purpose of gaining beneficial testimony. 74 Is justice
being served by this prosecutorial exemption from bribery statutes
that are otherwise universally applicable? Are prosecutors abusing
this grant of discretion to obtain sought-after testimony?
The disparity in the application of bribery provisions stems from
society's belief that the prosecution is motivated by a higher calling-
the promotion of justice. 75 It is believed that the defendant, however,
a person he believes may be called as a witness with the purpose of:
(A) Influencing the testimony of that person ...
(b) Witness bribery is a Class C felony.
E.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 5-53-109 (Michie 1993) provides in pertinent part:
(a) A person commits the offense of intimidating a witness if he threatens
a witness or a person he believes may be called as a witness with the
purpose of:
(1) Influencing the testimony of that person
(b) Intimidating a witness is a Class C felony.
E.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 5-53-110 (Michie 1993) provides in pertinent part:
(a) A person commits the offense of tampering if, believing that an official
proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he induces
or attempts to induce another person to:
(1) Testify or inform falsely ...
(b) Tampering is a Class A misdemeanor.
73. Note, Duty to Disclose Promises Made to Witnesses, supra note 7, at 887.
The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct (ATLA) (1980) Rule 3.10 provides: "[a]
lawyer shall not give a witness money or anything of substantial value, or threaten
a witness with harm, in order to induce the witness to testify. ..
74. Eisenstadt, supra note 3, at 762.
75. Eisenstadt, supra note 3, at 762. This disparity was born out in United
States v. Turkish,. 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981),
when the Second Circuit rejected the proposition that the prosecution and defense
should have equality in power. The court stated:
The prosecution assumes substantial affirmative obligations and accepts
numerous restrictions, neither of which are imposed on the defendant ....
[I]n the context of criminal investigation and criminal trials, where accuser
and accused have inherently different roles, with entirely different powers
and rights, equalization is not a sound principle on which to extend any
19941
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is intent only upon escaping conviction and punishment. 76 Therefore,
it is reasoned that allowing defendants to procure favorable testimony
through promise of reward would invite abuse of the system. 77
Assuming that this is an apt description, is it appropriate to contrast
the prosecutor and the defendant when considering the wisdom of
allowing bartered testimony? When witness contingency fee agree-
ments are used, are we not, in reality, pitting one defendant against
another defendant? We are dealing with opposing actors in the same
production having equal desire to escape punishment. Consequently,
the Government witness is equally inclined to fabricate testimony to
appear cooperative and, thus, gain favorable treatment for his own
criminal transgressions .78
III. CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENTS PROMOTE PERJURY AND
THEREBY DEPRIVE DEFENDANTS OF DUE PROCESS
A promise of favorable treatment in exchange for "cooperative"
testimony creates an incentive for perjury. 79 It is generally in a
cooperative witness's best interest to incriminate a defendant in order
to shift blame and thus reduce his own culpability, as well as to
comply with the conditions of his plea bargain arrangement with
the prosecution.8 0 By its own analysis, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized the strong inducement for perjury that flows from use of
plea agreements.8' As the Court observed in Washington v. Texas,8 2
"[t]o think that criminals will lie to save their fellows but not to
particular procedural device.
Id. at 774-75. But see Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal
View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031, 1036-37 (1975) ("We are unlikely ever to know
how effectively the adversary technique would work toward truth if that were the
obJectLv o tfl thel cost1LOants3 . .... F1- u-ines UAAOf 
-011 t at4VULt,~ -simply5 stated, is
to win if possible without violating the law .... His is not the search for truth
as such.")
76. Eisenstadt, supra note 3, at 762.
77. Eisenstadt, supra note 3, at 762.
78. See Note, Duty to Disclose Promises Made to Witnesses, supra note 7, at
890. "Despite their lofty, truth-seeking rationale, promises of favorable treatment
directly premised on 'cooperative' testimony create a clear incentive for falsification.
The witness has a compelling motive to give testimony harmful to the defendant.
If the truth will not suffice, he will be inclined to fabricate." Id.
79. Duty to Disclose Promises Made to Witnesses, supra note 7, at 890.
80. Duty to Disclose Promises Made to Witnesses, supra note 7, at 890.
81. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1967) ("[Clommon sense
would suggest that [the government witness] often has a greater interest in lying
in favor of the prosecution rather than against it, especially if he is still awaiting
his own trial or sentencing.")
82. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
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obtain favors from the prosecution for themselves is indeed to clothe
the criminal class with more nobility than one might expect to find
in the public at large." '8 3
Lower courts are equally aware of the coercive effect that
contingent agreements have upon witness testimony." The Sixth
Circuit noted in United States v. Grimes:"5
Although it is true that the informant working under [a contingent
fee arrangement] may be prone to lie and manufacture crimes,
he is no more likely to commit these wrongs than witnesses acting
for other, more common reasons. Frequently, for example, one
co-defendant testifies against another co-defendant with the ex-
pectation of favorable treatment as a reward for his testimony.
Like the informant being paid on a contingent fee basis, a co-
defendant so testifying may feel it imperative to obtain a con-
viction of his co-defendant in order to improve his own position.
Similarly, informants paid on bases other than a contingent ar-
rangement may feel that their employment will be terminated if
they do not bring about a conviction. Therefore, despite ad-
monitions to the contrary, they may believe that their future
employment as an informant depends on the manufacture of
crimes in order to prove their worth to the government. Neither
of these methods of 'paying' informers has been seriously attacked
by the courts; yet the potential for abuse is obvious in each
case.86
While the potential for perjury and abuse is present any time
the government "pays" for testimony, common sense leads to the
inescapable conclusion that the greater the perceived benefit, the
greater the likelihood of perjury.87 While both traditional plea agree-
ments and contingent fee agreements involve reward, those agree-
ments which include leniency, immunity, large monetary benefits,
or a combination of inducements are most troublesome.
Furthermore, the witness's perception of what the prosecutor
wishes to hear will affect the content of the particular testimony he
83. Id. at 22-23.
84. All plea agreements provide incentives for the witness to testify in a manner
which pleases the prosecution. Boone v. Paderick, 541 F.2d 447, 451 (4th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977); See also United States v. Meinster, 619
F.2d 1041, 1045 (4th Cir. 1980) ("[P]romises of immunity or leniency premised
on cooperation in a particular case may provide a strong inducement to falsify in
that case."); DuBose v. LeFevre, 619 F.2d 973, 979 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that
agreements create incentives for witnesses to testify favorably for prosecution).
85. 438 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 989 (1971).
86. Grimes, 438 F.2d at 395-96.
87. Beeman, supra note 1, at 820.
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provides.8 Witnesses interpret "full cooperation" differently. Some
will provide truthful testimony while others will embellish and falsify
the testimony to ensure favorable treatment.8 9 A vague or tentative
promise to show leniency toward the witness may increase the wit-
ness's impression that he will only receive help from the Government
if his testimony is particularly damaging to the defendant.9 As one
commentator observed:
The prosecutor, or his agent, discovered the eyewitness, the glass
covered with fingerprints, and the evidence reflected in the police
report. These items existed independently of the prosecutor's
initiative. A promise of favorable treatment, however, exists only
because of the prosecutor's deliberate action. The prosecutor,
taking advantage of a power conferred on him but denied to the
defendant, has himself provided a motive to lie.9'
There is an assumption that prosecutors will subordinate their
zeal for convictions to their higher calling-the pursuit of justice. 92
Hence, prosecutors have been given broad discretion in the use of
plea agreements. 93 This prosecutorial discretion is limited, however,
by the fundamental rights guaranteed to each citizen through the
United States Constitution. 94 The ultimate responsibility for curtailing
abuses of prosecutorial discretion which violate constitutional rights
lies with the judiciary. 95
One of the fundamental rights endowed by the Constitution is
the right to due process of law. Both the Fifth and Fourteenth
88. Beeman, supra note 1, at 820.
89. Beeman, supra note 1, at 820.
90. See Boone v. Paderick, 541 F.2d 447, 451 (4th Cir. 1976) (observing that
the more uncertain the agreement, the greater the incentive to say what prosecutor
would like to hear).
91. Duty to Dfisclose Promises Made to Witnesses, supra note 7, at 895.
92. Eisenstadt, supra note 3, at 762. See also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.
97, 110-11 (1976) (quoting Burger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBITY EC 7-13 (stating that it is the duty of
prosecutors to "seek justice, not merely to convict").
93. See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 697 F.2d 1229, 1235 (5th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983) (observing that prosecutorial discretion stems
from separation of powers doctrine); United States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241, 247
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 846 (1982) (noting that the executive branch
is empowered by the Constitution to faithfully execute laws); United States v.
Hamm, 659 F.2d 624, 628 n.13 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (stating that courts must
balance the constitutional delegation of law enforcement to the executive branch
with the constitutional power of the judicial branch and give deference to pros-
ecutorial discretion).
94. United States v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900, 911 (Ist Cir. 1984).
95. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (holding that
Chinese launderers were denied equal protection because singled out for prosecution).
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Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee every de-
fendant the right to a fair trial. Because the Due Process Clause
zealously protects the "integrity of the fact-finding process,'"'9 it
dictates exclusion of manifestly unreliable evidence. 97 To promote
justice and prevent admission of blatantly suspect testimony, the
courts must assume their proper roles as overseers of the process
and guardians of the Constitution.
Unfortunately, few courts have been willing to speak out about
prosecutorial abuse of discretion in use of contingency fee agree-
ments. The Fifth Circuit stood virtually alone in rejecting agreements
that provide strong inducement to fabricate and embellish, and
proclaimed boldly on two occasions that it would no longer tolerate
contingent agreements which transcend fair play and invite perjury.
In Williamson v. United States8 the court declared, "it becomes
the duty of the courts in federal criminal cases to require fair and
lawful conduct from federal agents in the furnishing of evidence of
crimes."99 In a concurring opinion, Judge Brown vigorously de-
nounced prosecutorial use of rewards to obtain incriminating tes-
timony, and reiterated, "[w]hat we hold is that, recognized as is
the role of informer in the enforcement of criminal laws, there comes
a time when enough is more than enough-it is just too much.
When that occurs, the law must condemn it as offensive whether
the method used is refined or crude, subtle or spectacular."'100
In United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco"°" the Fifth Circuit rejected
a contingency fee arrangement because the court found that the
contingent fee agreement provided a strong financial incentive for
the witness to commit perjury. 0 2 The court observed, "[i]t is true
that the precedents we cite are timid in their approach to this problem,
fearful that somehow the condemnation of contingent fee arrange-
ments will destroy our criminal justice system. If that be true, then
our system of finding the truth is pallid and weak and not to be
trusted."' 13 Cervantes-Pacheco, however, was later reconsidered en
96. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (quoting Berger v. California, 393
U.S. 314, 315 (1969)).
97. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972) (holding that due
process is violated when government offers testimony prosecutor knows to be false).
98. 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962), overruled by United States v. Cervantes-
Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1987).
99. Id. at 444.
100. Id. at 445 (Brown, John R., concurring).
101. 800 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 826 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied sub nom, Nelson v. United States, 484 U.S. 1026 (1988).
102. Id. at 460.
103. Id. at 461.
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banc and the Fifth Circuit watered down this language by holding
that contingent fee agreements are not per se unconstitutional. " 4
The District Court for the Southern District of Texas also found
that the contingent fee agreement utilized in United States v. Baresh05
violated due process because it was conducive to perjury.106 In the
same year, 1984, the Eighth Circuit decided United States v.
Waterman'0 7 in which the original panel concluded that offering
favorable treatment contingent upon testimony resulting in an in-
dictment violated due process. '8 Four of the eight participating judges
considered the contingent agreement unconstitutional.' 9
The majority of courts, however, have upheld contingent fee
agreements, even in the absence of a finding that the testimony
offered therewith was trustworthy." 0 For example, in United States
v. Winter"' the First Circuit noted: (1) that there were "apparent
holes in [the witness's] testimony' 1; I2 (2) that it was established on
both direct and cross-examination that the witness was a liar;' and
(3) that "[s]everal of the defendants also introduced, or discovered
through cross-examination of [the witness], evidence that directly
contradicted his testimony.""14 The court, nonetheless, concluded
that, given the number of incidents involved and the number of
years between the incidents and the trial, errors in memory were
not indications that the witness was lying.1 5
In like fashion, the Fifth Circuit allowed the testimony of a
contingent fee witness in United States v. Kimble' 6 who admitted
104. United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied sub nom, Nelson v. United States, 484 U.S. 1026 (1988).
105. 595 F. Supp. 1132 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
106. Id. at 1137.
107. 732 F.2d 1527 (8th Cir. 1984), vacated en banc, cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065
(1985).
108. Id. at 1531.
109. Id. at 1533.
110. See, e.g., United States v. Kimble, 719 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984) ("The government's case was based largely on
the testimony of Simoneaux .... Simoneaux acknowledged that he was dishonorable
and that he had repeatedly lied, including lies under oath, to save his own skin.");
United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1127 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1011 (1983).
111. 663 F.2d 1120 (1st Cir. 1981).
112. Id. at 1132.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1135. The court also did not find it significant that the lead counsel
in the case had signed the contingency agreement with the witness. Id.
116. 719 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984).
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on the stand: (1) that "he was dishonorable";"' (2) that he had
lied on several occasions, including lies under oath, to save himself;",
and (3) that he testified because he would get a lenient sentence if
his cooperation was considered acceptable." 9 The court decided that
certain factors which reflected negatively on the witness's veracity,
such as his admission of perjury and of lying in more than thirty
statements for self-preservation, went only to the weight of the
testimony, not admissibility.' 20
In United States v. Spector 2' the Eighth Circuit retreated from
its earlier stance in United States v. Waterman'22 by condoning use
of a government contingency agreement that made the one in Wa-
terman appear meek by comparison. 2  The Government not only
offered the possibility of immunity to the witness, his family, and
his girl friend, but also promised a one thousand dollar bonus if
his testimony brought about a conviction. 24 The Government warned
117. Id. at 1255.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1256-57. Judge Politz reasoned that the defense could remind the
jury that the witness was a perjurer who had perjured himself before the Grand
Jury in regard to this trial and who was then testifying under a contingency
agreement. Id. at 1257.
121. 793 F.2d 932 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
122. 732 F.2d 1527 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985). See supra
notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
123. 793 F.2d at 934. The agreement in Spector promised the witness, his family,
and girl friend immunity and freedom from prosecution for past crimes if the
government found his cooperation satisfactory. The agreement boldly stated:
The Government will carefully and in good faith consider and evaluate
[the witness's] cooperation and the information he provides in making its
determination whether or not to reduce or forgo [sic] some or all of the
aforesaid maximum charges and imprisonment exposure. In short, this
Office will review in good faith the extent and value of [the witness's]
information and cooperation as it relates to successfully solving and pros-
ecuting crimes. The more important we deem that information and co-
operation, the more likely the reduction of charges and his sentencing
risk.
Id.
In contrast, the agreement in Waterman that four members of the court found
violative of due process two years earlier merely provided:
[I]f [the witness's] cooperation in the form of truthful testimony led to
further indictments, the government would (1) affirmatively recommend
that [the witness's] sentence be reduced by two years, and (2) inform
appropriate federal agencies of the fact and extent of [the witness's]
cooperation. If, however, [the witness's] testimony did not lead to the
indictment of other individuals, then the government would acknowledge
and inform the Court of [the witness's] cooperation, but would not spe-
cifically recommend any reduction in his sentence.
732 F.2d at 1530.
124. 793 F.2d at 934, 937 n.3.
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that the value of the information and cooperation would determine
whether the witness received all, some, or none of the benefits.' "
However, the Spector decision may have turned more on the court's
view of the correlation between the witness's testimony and the
defendant's conviction than on the court's view of the constitu-
tionality of the witness agreement. In Spector the court concluded
that the witness's testimony was insubstantial; 126 in Waterman the
witness's testimony was critical to the verdict. 127 If so, the court
actually rendered a "harmless error" decision disguised as a "due
process" one. The decision may nevertheless be cited in the future
as support for the constitutionality of this type agreement when the
testimony is much more crucial to the verdict.
Furthermore, most courts find it acceptable in cases involving
a defendant who has entered into a contingency fee agreement to
postpone sentencing hearings until after the witness has testified.'
This allows sentencing concessions that are dependent upon the value
of the witness's testimony to the Government's case. The length of
any applicable sentence is a primary concern to a defendant facing
incarceration and the first question raised by a defendant considering
a guilty plea. Therefore, withholding sentencing until after the ren-
dition of testimony creates an extremely coercive environment for
the plea bargainer and greatly increases the likelihood of perjury.
Moreover, the federal sentencing law was recently changed to
allow only the Government to move for a sentence reduction fol-
lowing sentencing. Under Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 29 the Government may move within a year following
sentencing to lower the defendant's sentence to a level below the
minimum statutory sentence. Under this provision, the court is pro-
hibited from taking favorable notice of cooperation in the absence
of a Government motion to that effect. 30 This provision serves as
an inducement to a witness to provide further incriminating testimony
125. Id.
126. Id. at 936. The court stated, "[h]owever, Adams' testimony had very little
to do with the conviction of Spector." Id.
127. 732 F.2d at 1528. The Eighth Circuit stated in Waterman, "[blecause the
testimony given pursuant to this agreement was critical to support Waterman's
conviction, we reverse the district court's denial of his section 2255 motion." Id.
128. See, e.g., United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192 (1st Cir. 1985); United
States v. Kimble, 719 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984);
United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841
(1970).
129. Rule 35(b) provides:
The court, on motion of the Government made within one year after the
imposition of a sentence, may reduce a sentence to reflect a defendant's
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even after he has been incarcerated. The potential for conjured
testimony to reduce the existing sentence seems abundantly clear.
In addition, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide for a
reduced sentence under Section 5KI.1 for substantial assistance to
the Government. 3' To activate the provision, the Government must
move for a reduction. Efforts by the defense alone to obtain benefits
for substantial assistance are not rewarded, despite the extent .of
rendered assistance.3 2 Thus, a defendant must provide testimony
that meets Government approval to receive sentencing benefits. This
pressures the defendant to produce the type of information that he
believes would be deemed "substantial" in the eyes of the Govern-
ment. 3
3
IV. CONCLUSION
As evidenced by recent case law, courts are becoming increasingly
more lenient in allowing testimony under contingency agreements. 34
Agreements which would likely have been denounced in earlier years
are now readily accepted because of decisions relied upon as per-
suasive, if not precedential authority. 3 The trend is to allow the
prosecution to reach whatever bargain it can and then rely upon
institutional safeguards, such as cross-examination and jury instruc-
tions, to expose any incidents of perjury generated thereby. This
reluctance to censure prosecutorial agreements is defended by reit-
eration of the "separation of powers" doctrine, although it flies in
subsequent, substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
another person who has committed an offense, in accordance with the
guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission
pursuant to section 994 of title 28, United States Code .... The court's
authority to reduce a sentence under this subsection includes the authority
to reduce such sentence to a level below that established by statute as a
minimum sentence.
FED. R. CIum. P. 35(b).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Reina, 905 F.2d 638, 640 (2nd Cir. 1990); United
States v. Ortez, 902 F.2d 61, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1990). But see United States v. Havener,
905 F.2d 3, 8 (1st Cir. 1990) (concluding court could consider defendant's cooperation
in absence of a motion by government).
131. U.S.S.G. § 5KI.I & App. C.
132. See, e.g., United States v. French, 900 F.2d 1300, 1302 (8th Cir. 1990)
("[Tlhe District Court, without a motion by the government, had no authority
even to consider a downward departure under Section 5KI.1."). In French the
defendant argued on appeal that he had provided substantial assistance, but was
given no reduction under Section 5KI.I. Id.
133. Hughes, supra note 2, at 44-45.
134. See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
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the face of other constitutional provisions that are deserving of equal
import and emphasis.
Likewise, the Federal Sentencing Commission, by including the
substantial assistance category in Rule 35(b) and section 5Kl.1, has
shown a propensity to draft around the Constitution.136 Nonetheless,
the Guideline provisions have been repeatedly declared constitutional
by the courts whenever defendants dared to challenge them. Perhaps,
as Judge Goldberg concluded in United States v. Cervantes-Pa-
checo,3 7 courts are fearful that the criminal justice system cannot
survive without testimony obtained through contingency fee agree-
ments. Considering that contingency agreements are a relatively new
device in criminal prosecution, one cannot help but wonder how
the system managed to function for centuries without them.
While recognizing that the prosecution does take its obligation
to protect the public interest seriously, the courts must also remember
that prosecutors are advocates who are first and foremost trained
to win. One writer wisely observed, and was bold enough to declare,
that the advocate's primary goal may not be to uncover the truth
in every case because "the truth and victory are mutually incom-
patible for some considerable percentage of the attorneys trying cases
at any given time."' 38 As painful as it may be, it is time for the
judicial system to deal with reality as it exists rather than with the
ideal.
Furthermore, juries should not be left with the task of discerning
which pieces of evidence are inherently unreliable. Unreliable evidence
is judicially excluded under the hearsay rule and other evidentiary
provisions. No one would dare suggest that blatant hearsay should
be allowed because the jury can determine its believability or that
a procedure for identifying suspects which is highly suggestive should
be ignored because the jury can resolve its reliability. Yet, the courts
have attempted to deal with testimony offered under unconscionable
contingent agreements in that very fashion.
The time has come for the judiciary to once again resume its
responsibility of fervently protecting cherished constitutional rights,
and if prosecutorial discretion must be limited to achieve that goal,
so be it. Limits must be placed on the use of contingency fee
agreements, and testimony offered in conjunction with agreements
which violate constitutional standards must be excluded as inherently
136. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
137. 800 F.2d 452, 461 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd 826 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied sub nom, Nelson v. United States, 484 U.S. 1026 (1988).
138. See Frankel, supra note 75, at 1037.
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unreliable because of the likelihood of perjury. Moreover, the Gov-
ernment should never be allowed to provide monetary compensation
under a cooperation agreement. After all, regardless of the label
used, this is tantamount to paying a witness to testify favorably for
a party. Anyone who pays a witness to testify is subject to felony
indictment under federal bribery statute, and there is no express,
statutory exception for prosecutors. The courts have merely chosen
to excuse this outrageous misconduct and construe the law as applying
to everyone but the Government. The Government, above all others,
should follow the letter of the law or our legal system will eventually
become a mockery.
Prosecutors should also be barred from dismissing charges against
family members of a contingent fee witness. Would-be witnesses are
often more concerned about a spouse, mother, or child serving time
than they are about their own possible incarceration. A promise to
dismiss charges against a family member is, by its very nature, so
coercive that testimony derived thereby is suspect.
Courts could set standards that delineate options for the pros-
ecution to include in any given agreement. For example, the court
could mandate that prosecutors can offer reduction of a possible
sentence to the next level, immunity from prosecution of one charge,
or loss of forfeiture on one piece of property. In addition, the
prosecution could be allowed to offer any two concessions in ex-
change for cooperation and testimony, but no more. This would
provide some guidance for the prosecution in utilizing contingency
fee agreements and stem the flow of ever-increasing combinations
of promises to obtain desired testimony. If testimony is then offered
under an agreement that does not comport with judicially imposed
standards, it should automatically be excluded as unreliable under
due process. In the absence of intervention by the courts, it appears
likely that the Government will continue to escalate its use of
contingency fee agreements, as well as the number and quality of
concessions offered thereunder, and due process will become a hollow
phrase proclaimed in the classroom and ignored in the courtroom.
1994]

